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An experiment was performed to assess the efficacy of Post-experimental Inquiry 
(PEI) questions. Experiments involving deception assume participant naiveté to the study 
protocol. The present study implemented a PEI to assess the influence of an ethnic prime 
on stereotyped attitudes in order to assess PEI accuracy. A confederate (posting as 
another participant) additionally informed some participants as to the true purpose of the 
study, a violation of study integrity. The PEI was used to assess accuracy in two ways: 
awareness of the study hypotheses and admission to receiving information. The PEI was 
itself manipulated in one of two ways; the introduction of a descriptive norm paragraph 
(vs. control) and default option swapped (vs. control). Participants informed of the study 
hypothesis reported higher awareness and admitted more information. The norm prime 
and default option swapped conditions did not increase PEI accuracy. The implications 







The use of deception in psychology has a long history, perhaps as old as the 
discipline itself (Nicks, Korn, & Mainieri, 1997). Deception, which is providing any 
information to intentionally mislead participants, is used if there are no alternative non-
deceptive procedures to collect the same information (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2008). When 
deception is used in psychological research, it is used because the researcher assumes that 
full awareness of the study protocol would change the results of the experiment; for some 
classic and contemporary procedures, this is obviously so. For example, Milgram’s 
classic study on obedience (1963) could not have been performed without some level of 
deception. For more subtle procedures (such as Lepore & Brown, 2002), researchers 
assume that naïve participants provide more honest feedback in certain tasks. In these 
procedures, quality of data hinges on participants’ naiveté to study details, so the majority 
of researchers use some form of post-experimental inquiries to assess participant level of 
information (Blackhart, Brown, Clark, Pierce, & Shell, 2012). The present experimental 
study assessed this assumption—that post-experimental inquiries accurately delineate 
naïve participants from non-naïve participants.  
Golding and Lichtenstein (1970) formulated four factors necessary for deception: 
(1) suspiciousness of the protocol will not affect its response outcomes; (2) participants 
arrive with no knowledge of the experiment; (3) the experiment does not indicate to 
participants they are being deceived; and (4) knowledge of the experiment gained before 
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or during the protocol can be assessed by the experimenter. Violations of these 
assumptions, if undetected, seriously compromise the integrity of experimental results. 
There are empirical reasons to be cautious about all four factors. 
Does deception or suspiciousness influence experimental results? 
 Suspiciousness of the experimental protocol or having any information about the 
protocol at all can change behavioral outcomes. Gardner (1978) conducted a series of 
studies on the negative aftereffects of a noise blast during the period in which ethics 
guidelines began to mandate providing subjects with informed consent forms. The 
researcher discovered that the negative aftereffects of a noise blast vanished in 
participants for whom informed consent was required; he initially discovered this effect 
in different groups of participants before and after the guidelines, then replicated this 
effect by experimentally manipulating the level of informed consent. Other phenomena 
similarly change or disappear depending on the level of information participants have 
(Adair, Dushenko, & Lindsay, 1985).  
 Changes in the information participants have changes the behaviors they exhibit 
in a study. Suspicious participants in a rigged impression formation experiment, for 
example, display less conformity than non-suspicious participants (Stang, 1976). Other 
researchers, directly manipulating the level of suspicion among participants by providing 
different degrees of information to them, have found that suspicion does not impact 
conformity studies (Gallo, Smith, & Mumford, 1973). Gallo and colleagues propose two 
interpretations for their lack of observed changes. Demand characteristics may lead 
participants to give information that lends itself to prove the experimenter correct. The 
second cause may be inattention; participants did not attend to or process the information 
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about the study hypotheses provided to them. Either situation creates a problem. By 
definition, participants that exhibit socially desirable answers are not giving unbiased 
data; participants that know details of the study but do not attend to these details may 
change their behavior in an experiment due to implicit influences without realizing and 
reporting that they have been influenced in some way. 
 In some experimental protocols, awareness of the true nature of the study would 
obviously compromise the results. In a classic psychology experiment, Milgram (1963) 
assigned participants to be a “teacher,” asking them to willingly administer progressively 
stronger electrical shocks to a “learner.” Students in introductory psychology courses will 
recognize this study and its false “learners,” who were experimental confederates. If the 
“teacher” participants also knew that the “learners” were not receiving dangerous, life-
threatening shocks, would the study still be about obeying authority figures in extreme 
situations?  
Not all psychology research depends so clearly on deception. Obedience to 
authority research is just one of many topics typically studied with deception. Topics 
such as social rejection are often studied with deceptive protocols, compounding the 
dangers of using deception because participants in a negative mood are more suspicious 
and more likely to detect deception (Forgas & East, 2008). Stereotyping research 
examines both automatic unconscious and controlled conscious reactions to outgroup 
individuals (Devine, 1989). By the very nature of stereotyping phenomena, some 
behaviors are automatic and some are controlled. Participants that are aware that 
stereotyping is being studied might report less stereotypes of Black individuals, whereas 
naïve participants will be racially biased in the same protocol (Lepore & Brown, 
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2002).Informed participants’ responses may be due to unbiased tendencies, social 
pressure, or implicit influences that are not immediately accessible by the participants 
themselves? 
 For theoretical and empirical reasons, the first assumption—that suspicion does 
not change the results of an experiment—is itself suspect. The problems associated with 
this assumption are nonexistent if participants have no suspicion about the study to begin 
with. This second assumption, however, has its own problems. 
Do participants arrive at the study with no information? 
For most experimental research, it is tacitly assumed that participants arrive to a 
study naïve to the true nature of the research. In reality, participants can get information 
about a study from a variety of sources. Crosstalk, the tendency for individuals in the 
participant pool to communicate with one another about the details of a study, increases 
over the course of an academic semester (Edlund, Sagarin, Skowronski, Johnson, & 
Kutter, 2009). Crosstalk can occur within a week of experimentation (Glinksi, Glinksi, & 
Slatin, 1970). Almost half of participants contacted by a confederate posing as a future 
participant in a meta-experiment by Lichtenstein (1973) shared details of the study they 
were instructed to keep secret; when participants were contacted by phone, 15 out of 19 
shared information.  
Participants that have experienced deception respond differently to subsequent 
experiments involving deception, perhaps to an increased vigilance or by the influence of 
demand characteristics (Cook &Perrin, 1971). Exacerbating these effects, participants 
who experience deception can exhibit noticeably different behaviors in the lab for up to 
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three months (Epley & Huff, 1998). Participants may become suspicious due to within-
experiment factors as well. 
Do experimental designs indicate to participants that they are being deceived?  
Participants can resolve the details of a study during the procedure itself; Taylor 
and Sheppard (1996) report an incident in which a graduate student was used as a stand-
in for a participant who unexpectedly canceled their appointment in a group experiment. 
Pretending to be another participant, the graduate student listened in as the participants 
shared the details they had collectively received about the study, uncovering the full 
research design in the process. The participants in this experiment had been explicitly 
told they were not allowed to share the details of the study in this way, and only one of 
the participants the graduate student overheard hinted at the conversation in a post-
experimental inquiry (PEI). The majority of researchers use some form of PEI just for the 
purpose of discovering the level of information participants know (Blackhart, Brown, 
Clark, Pierce, & Shell, 2011). Similar to Taylor and Sheppard’s (1996) happenstance 
finding, other researchers with knowledge of participant information level have found 
PEI use to be inaccurate.  
Do PEIs accurately detect suspicion or information? 
Growing evidence suggests that post-experimental inquiries do not, in reality, 
delineate very well between naïve and non-naïve participants. Some researchers (for 
example, see Aronson, 1968) report highly accurate PEIs. The majority of studies, 
however, report the opposite. When confederates were used to reveal a Naïve, 
Suspicious, or Informed information level to participants, Golding and Lichtenstein 
(1970) found no significant differences in participants’ self-reported awareness of the 
 
6 
study design or admission of receiving prior information in their PEI. Taylor and 
Sheppard (1996) received no strong reports of suspicion from participants that a graduate 
student literally witnessed discussing the experiment’s details. Levy (1967) reported an 
accuracy of one in 16 while Sagarin, Rhoads, and Cialdini (1998) reported one in 81. 
Nichols and Maner (2008) as well as McMillan and Austin (1971) reported zero PEI 
accuracy in different procedures.  
Blackhart et al (2012) again used a confederate to directly supply participants 
with a Naïve or Informed prompt. While the Informed participants reported significantly 
more awareness of the study hypothesis and admission of receiving information than the 
Naïve participants, the self-reported levels of awareness and receipt of information were 
abysmally lower than the true, experimentally introduced levels of information. The trend 
seen in the majority of studies is that PEI accuracy is generally low. 
Is there any hope for PEI accuracy? 
 Despite so much evidence that PEIs are inaccurate, steps can be taken to improve 
their accuracy. Golding and Lichtenstein (1970) introduced a scientific integrity prompt 
to some participants that significantly increased PEI accuracy. Blackhart et al (2012) 
experimentally manipulated whether participants received the PEI in-person or alone on a 
computer. It was found that participants responding anonymously on a computer 
produced significantly more accurate PEIs. Other measures, such as offering participants 
an extra credit or cash reward, have mixed or harmful efficacy (Blackhart et al, 2012).  
 Blackhart and colleagues (2012) attempted to discover why participants report 
such low rates of honesty. The most commonly cited reasons were concerns about not 
receiving credit (or payment), concerns about getting someone in trouble (42% expressed 
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concerned about getting themselves in trouble, while 35% expressed concern about 
getting someone else in trouble), and concerns about appearing foolish. These self-
reported areas of concern are personal concerns, whereas researchers using PEIs do so for 
professional considerations.  
What is the next step? 
 Progress has been made in discovering avenues to a more accurate PEI, but even 
the most promising results (e.g. Blackhart, et al, 2011) did not produce high levels of 
accuracy. In the present study, knowledge from the discipline of psychology itself was 
used to attempt to improve PEI accuracy. A previously used meta-experimental technique 
to assess PEI accuracy (adapted from Blackhart et al, 2012) was adapted for use with an 
experimental procedure that is, theoretically, very dependent on proper participant 
naïveté. As mentioned, one area in psychology that utilizes and depends on deceptive 
procedures is the study of stereotyping and prejudice. Research in this area is easily 
influenced by demand characteristics. For this reason, many protocols (for example, 
Lepore & Brown, 2002) are burdensome or impossible to perform without deception. If 
participants are aware of the purpose of a study measuring their prejudiced attitudes 
toward racial minorities, they may monitor their responses and curb naturally occurring 
responses. In fact, this appears to be exactly the case in a recent study exploring the effect 
of racial primes on prejudicial attitudes. Participants who became suspicious of the 
manipulation used by Lepore and Brown (2002), as determined by a suspicion probe, 
differed from non-suspicious participants. A statistically significant interaction emerged 
in which low-prejudice participants and high-prejudice participants reversed their scores 
relative to non-suspicious individuals. Because of the methodological difficulties 
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associated with this study, this procedure was a perfect candidate for the meta-
experimental test of a PEI. 
 The aims of the current study were to improve upon previous PEI procedures. 
PEIs are administered at the end of an experiment and are restricted in several ways by 
the nature of psychological inquiry. PEIs cannot be too invasive or probing at the risk of 
causing naïve participants to then become suspicious; on the other hand, PEIs must be 
detailed enough to elicit information from participants (Stricker, 1969). PEI questions 
vary from researcher to researcher and across experiments (Blackhart et al, 2012). In 
searching for candidate techniques to improve PEI accuracy, then, a good practice would 
be to implement procedures that are uncomplicated, theoretically promising, and can be 
generalized to PEIs in various areas of research. The PEI was augmented in the current 
study by the manipulation of two social influence techniques, a descriptive norm prime 
and a default option switch. The reasoning for the selection of these techniques is 
outlined below.  
The social influence of descriptive norms 
 Psychology has a wide and deep foundation of research on social influence 
techniques (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Social norms inform as to the proper or typical 
behavior in a situation. Norms can be classified into descriptive and injunctive. 
Descriptive norms are those that describe what the typical behavior in a certain situation 
is; injunctive norms are those that describe the belief about what is typically approved 
behavior, by some standard, in a certain situation (Cialdini & Goldsteain, 2004; Cialdini, 
Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). Social norms are most efficacious when they are most salient 
(Kallgren, Reno, & Cialdini, 2000).  
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 Participants have expectations about what “typical participants” do during 
experiments, and what “typical participants” ought to do during experiment. These 
expectations are usually not formalized. When directly asked, participants expect some 
level of deception in psychology research and express hesitation at reporting harmful 
information to researchers (Blackhart et al, 2012, Study 4). Participants could be given 
information about the injunctive norm to give accurate feedback during experiments, but 
reminding naïve, non-suspicious participants that they should report suspicions may have 
the unintended consequence of eliciting suspicions. In the present research, participants 
brought their own social norm evaluations to bear when completing the PEI. The 
descriptive norms brought to the study by participants may have varied. If the prevailing 
norm for a participant was to withhold information in psychology research, that 
participant might have been less likely to give accurate information on the PEI. 
Presenting participants with an opposite descriptive norm--that participants in similar 
studies divulge information that may be damaging to the study--was expected to increase 
reporting on the PEI by making the norm not only known but salient (Goldstein, Cialdini, 
& Griskevicius, 2008). 
The inertia of choosing the default option 
 In a choice situation the default option is often favored. This can be due to a lack 
of effort or an assumption that the default option is preferred (Johnston & Goldstein, 
2003). Another explanation may be that the default option carries an implied descriptive 
norm. Changing the default option can have drastic consequences, as in the case of organ 
donation. Keeping many important factors controlled for, European nations who require 
citizens to opt-out of being an organ donor have double the organ-donation rates of 
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nations with opting-in as the default choice (Johnston & Goldstein, 2003). The bias 
toward lack of action in choice has also been found in a controlled laboratory setting 
(Baron & Ritov, 1994).  
 In the typical PEI, participants are asked general questions about the study but are 
not required to volunteer any information (see Blackhart, et al, 2012 for examples of 
typical PEI questions). This may be biasing participants in two ways. First, the “default” 
option is to give no information regarding prior information by leaving the form blank; 
this may lead to the default position bias outlined above. Second, participants may 
suspect that the norm is to withhold information, leading to a lack of admission typical of 
that perceived norm. 
Social desirability and social monitoring 
 While the primary goal of the current study was to test external influences on 
participants’ responding on the PEI, individual differences also play a role in participant 
responding. Social desirability and demand characteristics are often used as an 
explanation of participants’ lack of responding to PEI questions (Blackhart et al, 2012; 
Gallo, Smith, & Mumford, 1973; Golding & Lichtenstein, 1973). Measures such as the 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale can be used to assess the level of social 
desirability present in participants (Reynolds, 1982). Social monitoring, the degree to 
which one monitors one’s actions by taking into account observation by another (Snyder, 
1974), is another trait measure that can be used to test the oft-voiced worry about 
participant demand characteristics. Participants high in social monitoring may be more 
aware of the social consequences of their behavior in an experiment, and may answer 




Experimental Design and Hypotheses 
A previously used deceptive procedure was replicated with the addition of a new 
formal PEI to determine if participant awareness of the study protocol changed the 
findings of the original research protocol. The study is also an evaluation of the PEI 
itself, introducing controlled independent variables with the goal of improving PEI 
accuracy. The PEI procedure used in the present study was representative of procedures 
commonly used by social psychologists (Blackhart et al, 2012); evidence for its 
improvement, then, should be applicable to many experimenters in this field. 
Utilizing a procedure first used by Levy (1967) and replicated recently by 
Blackhart et al (2012), participant awareness of the project hypothesis was directly 
manipulated. Although it can be expected that baseline knowledge of any experiment 
involving deception will increase in the participant pool while the study is active (Edlund, 
et al, 2009), the levels of participant awareness are not endogenously large enough to use 
as an intrinsic variable. Instead, awareness of the study hypothesis was directly 
manipulated by the experimental procedure via an experimental confederate. This 
changes the ordinary study design into a deception within a deception, in essence. Using 
this procedure, participants completing the study were divided into Informed and Naïve 
groups and compared. As in previous research (Blackhart, et al, 2012), different 
independent variables were then introduced in an attempt to improve the PEI accuracy.  
 Thus, in this study-within-a-study design, participants arrived at the lab and 
completed a typical stereotype activation procedure by filling out some questionnaires on 
paper then completing some computer tasks. Before this began, however, an extra layer 
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of experimental manipulation happened—a confederate encountered the participant and 
started a conversation with him or her, providing them with information (or not, in the 
control condition) about the manipulation of stereotype information in the study. We 
hypothesized an interaction effect whereby participants who knew about the manipulation 
of their stereotypes and experienced a cognitive task designed as an ethnic prime would 
report abnormally low levels of negative attitude toward a fictional person believed to be 
Black. Therefore, an interaction effect in which those who were informed and primed 
with negative stereotypes would report the lowest levels of negative attitude, relative to 
all other groups, was expected. It was also expected that participants’ negative rating of a 
hypothetical individual would be inversely related to social monitoring and social 
desirability. 
 Several simple independent variable effects were expected from ANOVA 
analyses of participants’ Admission and Awareness scores across all groups. Participants 
in the Informed condition were hypothesized to report higher Awareness and Admission. 
Participants in the Opt-out condition were predicted to report more Awareness and 
Admission. Participants in the descriptive norm prime condition were expected to report 






Participants and design 
 Participants were recruited via the University of North Dakota’s SONA data 
collection system. Participants signed up online to complete a study ostensibly about 
“word comprehension.” Seven participants were excluded from analyses for failing to 
complete the administered measures or choosing to leave before the study was 
completed, which participants could choose to do at any point in the experiment; this left 
a total sample size of 144. None of the participants that did choose to leave the study 
early raised any suspicions or discomforts before doing so. The sample was primarily 
female (N = 124), while a minority were male (N = 19) or declined to answer (N = 1). 
Participants were recruited from introductory level psychology classes only. Accordingly, 
the sample consisted primarily of freshman (N = 54) and sophomore (N = 64) students at 
the University of North Dakota; a minority were junior (N = 19) or senior (N = 5) 
students and one student declined to answer. Corresponding with class standing, the 
sample was very young, M = 19.52 years, SD = 2.24; only 11 participants were above the 
age of 21. The majority of participants were Caucasian, N = 131. Using G*Power 3.1, an 
estimate of sample size needed to achieve a power of .80 was estimated using similar 
effect size to Blackhart et al (2012). To achieve similar effect sizes, approximately 300 
participants were necessary; the actual sample was approximately half. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of 16 experimental conditions with a 
2 (informed vs. naïve) x 2 (ethnic primes vs. neutral words) x 2 (Opt-in vs. Opt-out) x 2 




 Upon arrival at the experimental setting, participants followed instructions posted 
at the study location to have a seat. While the participant was waiting, the experimenter 
greeted him/her and informed him/her that another participant was not done in the lab. 
The experimenter provided the participant a packet of materials including a 
demographics questionnaire, the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, and the 
Personal Reactions Inventory. While the participant was filling out these forms, the 
previous “participant” (in reality, our experimental confederate) exited the lab and 
greeted the current participant. The confederate was instructed to strike up a conversation 
with the participant and administer one of two prompts. The confederate either engaged 
in small talk (“Naïve” condition) or told the participant critical information about the 
upcoming study (“Informed” condition). In the Naïve condition, confederates used the 
script “Hey, how’s it going. Are you doing that word comprehension study? Oh, I did that 
study.” If the participant asked for more information, the confederate was trained to say, 
“I don’t really remember, but I did some stuff on the computer.” In the Informed 
condition, the script was “Hey, how’s it going. Are you doing that word comprehension 
study? Oh, I did that study. They don’t really care about the words; they’re really looking 
for racism.” If the participant asked for more information, the confederate was trained to 
say, “I don’t really remember, but they told me the stuff on the computer was looking at 
racism.” After waiting approximately five minutes, the experimenter returned to bring the 
participant into the lab setting. This time period was allotted to ensure that experimenters 
did not overhear the participant information level and to ensure that participants had time 
to complete the forms. 
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Social desirability and Social monitoring scale information.  
The 13 item Marlowe-Crown Desirability inventory (Reynolds, 1982) 
administered during this step was a measure of the tendency for participants to respond in 
a socially desirable manner; in other words, how likely participants are to respond in the 
manner they see as desirable above and beyond an unbiased answer. Participants 
responded to questions such as “I have never deliberately said something that hurt 
someone’s feelings”; participants who answer False to questions of this type are said to 
display greater social desirability.  The scale was internally reliable, Cronbach’s α = .663. 
The Personal Reactions Inventory (Snyder, 1974) was a measure of social monitoring 
that measures monitoring oneself to adhere to proper self-presentation. Participants 
responded to true/false questions such as “I may deceive people by being friendly even 
when I really dislike them”, with an answer of True displaying great social monitoring. 
This 25 item scale was internally reliable, Cronbach’s α = .618. 
Lexical decision task (Ethnic Prime/No prime Condition). 
Upon entering the experimental room, participants completed the Lexical 
Decision Task (LDT) using Inquisit by Millisecond Software. The LDT presents 
participants with rapidly appearing and disappearing English words along with English-
appearing nonwords. Participants were tasked with deciding if the letters on the screen 
are a word or nonword and pressing an appropriate key on the keyboard to indicate their 
choice. The LDT has a control and experimental condition. In the experimental Ethnic 
prime condition, some of the English words were neutral (Blacks) while others were 
negative racial primes (i.e., nigger, unemployed) adapted from Lepore & Brown, 1997 
Study 3. In the control condition, all English words were neutral with regard to race. 
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Impression Formation Task 
After participants completed the LDT, they completed the Impression Formation 
Task used by Lepore & Brown (2002). The impression formation task was introduced to 
participants as an unrelated measure. While signing up to participate in the study, 
participants were informed the study has multiple unrelated components.  
 In the Impression Formation task, participants were presented with eight 
sentences describing an individual; each sentence expressed a positive or negative 
stereotype for a total of four each. Participants then rated the individual on 21 rating 
scales that were used to assess positive or negative attitude toward the fictional person. 
Participants that were exposed to the ethnic prime were more likely to implicitly assume 
that the hypothetical individual was Black and adjust the positive and negative ratings 
accordingly.  
Post-experimental Inquiry 
Participants then engaged in the PEI designed to assess whether they had any 
prior knowledge of the study, were suspicious of the study, or knew/guessed the 
hypothesis of the study. In one version of the PEI, the form automatically assumed 
participants had previous knowledge of the study (Opt-out), and participants had the 
option to check a box indicating to the contrary; another version will be the standard PEI 
asking participants to volunteer any knowledge (Opt-in, Control). Some participants were 
informed in the PEI instructions that of participants with prior knowledge, a majority 
indicate so on the form (Norm prime); others did not receive this additional information 
(Control). All forms of the PEI contained the same questions, only differing by one 
checkbox independent variable and one prompt independent variable. The PEI consisted 
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of free-response questions. The PEI was coded into two independent categories, 
awareness of the study hypothesis (Awareness) and admission of receiving previous 
information (Admission). 
Following the presentation of these questions, participants were debriefed and 
given an opportunity to ask questions. The impression formation sentences, PEI 






Social Desirability and Social Monitoring 
It was expected that social desirability and social monitoring would be positively 
related to a more positive rating of the hypothetical individual. In other words, 
participants with high social monitoring were expected to adjust their response to the 
hypothetical individual to be more positive. No significant correlations were found 
between social desirability scores and rating of the individual. The most robust 
correlation found was between the Personal Reactions Inventory and Negative rating for 
only individuals in the Informed information condition, r = .22, p = .07. In other words, 
for participants with information about the study design higher social monitoring was 
related to higher negative rating of the fictional individual.  
 The Spearman rho correlation was used to detect relationship between Admission 
and Awareness with social desirability. Interestingly, for all participants combined 
Admission and Awareness were correlated, rho = .50, p < .001. For Naïve participants, 
this relationship did not hold, rho = .053, p = .66. The relationship appears to originate 
from Informed participants, rho = .60, p < .001.  
 Informed participants did show a positive relationship between social monitoring 
and Negative Rating, rho = .26, p = .03, such that participants high in social monitoring 
rated the hypothetical individual as having more negative qualities, the opposite direction 





Negative attitude toward a hypothetical individual 
An interaction effect was expected such that Informed/Ethnic prime participants 
would rate the individual with less negative ratings, compared to all other groups. A 2 
(Informed/Naïve) x 2 (Ethnic prime/Control) ANOVA was performed to determine 
changes in negative attitudes. The main effect of confederate information 
(Informed/Naïve) was not significant, F(1, 144) = 2.381, p = .125, η
2
 = .016. The main 
effect of Ethnic prime (Ethnic prime/Control) was also not significant, F(1, 144) = .56, p 
= .45, η
2
 = .004. The interaction was not significant, F(1, 144) = .615, p = .43, η
2
 = .004. 
For group means, see Table 1. The observed power for the main effect of confederate 
information indicated a low chance of detecting an effect, .335, and the observed power 
for Ethnic prime and the interaction were minimal, <.13. This suggests that although no 
effect was found, the lack of statistical significance could be an issue of inadequate 
power. The ANOVA analysis was conducted with less participants than minimum 
recommendations; ratings were almost identical across conditions, indicating lack of 
effect, lack of power, or inadequate sampling. 
Social influences on Admission and Awareness 
It was hypothesized that both social influence independent variables would increase both 
Admission and Awareness. Admission and Awareness were scored on a 1 – 5 scale, with 
1 indicating no information given and 5 indicating full Awareness of the study hypothesis 
or full Admission of receiving detailed information about the study (for full scoring 
information, see Appendix). Over half of participants received a score of 1 on Awareness 
and a score of 1 on Admission (see Table 2 for full breakdown). Only 29 out of 145 
participants received a score of 5 on Awareness. Broken down by information level 
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(Informed x Naïve), one of these participants were in the Naïve group. Only 19 
participants scored a full 5 on Admission; all 19 were Informed. 
Participant information level. Participants in the Naïve information level 
experienced a laboratory experiment that was typical of many studies in social, cognitive, 
and other areas of psychology. Thus, a χ
2
 test was performed for both Awareness and 
Admission using the frequencies of Awareness and Admission in the Naïve level as 
expected frequencies and the frequencies of Awareness and Admission in the Informed 
level as observed frequencies. In this way, the direct result of providing participants with 
outside information about the study can be assessed. For the purposes of the χ
2
 test, the 
five levels of Awareness and Admission were collapsed to two. Participants receiving a 
score of 1 to 3 on Admission or Awareness were coded as providing minimal 
information, while participants scoring a 4 to 5 were coded as providing substantial 
information. The cutoff point was a practical one: participants providing the type of 
information that would merit a 4 or 5 would, in ordinary studies, be candidates to be 
excluded from data analysis (such as in Lepore & Brown, 1997). 
The χ
2
 test for Awareness was significant, χ
2
 = 502.86, p < .001, indicating that 
more participants in the Informed condition provided more substantial information than 
in the Naïve condition. The χ
2 
test for Admission was significant, χ
2
 = 526.16, p < .001, 
indicating that participants in the Informed condition provided more substantial 
information than in the Naïve condition.  
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Table 1. Mean Negative Attitude scores by group 
Confederate. info* Mean Ethnic Prime** Mean 
Informed 5.74 Ethnic Prime 5.81 
Naïve 6.02 Control 5.95 
*All participants divided by level of information provided by the confederate. 
**All participants divided by seeing neutral words or stereotype activation words in the 
Lexical Decision task. 
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Table 2. Awareness and Admission scores for all participants and subdivided by 
information level. 
 Summary of Awareness and Admission   
























Awareness and Admission subdivided by Information level 
Admission 
score 




Informed freq Naïve freq 
1 44 56 1 34 55 
2 2 5 2 5 10 
3 5 7 3 2 2 
4 6 1 4 7 1 
5 19 0 5 28 1 
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Awareness. A 2 (Informed/Naïve) x 2 (Opt-in/Opt-out) x 2 (Descriptive 
norm/Control) x 2 (Ethnic prime/No prime) ANOVA was conducted for Awareness. The 
main effect of confederate information was significant, F(1, 129) = 36.33, p < .001, η
2
 = 
.22, with participants in the Informed condition (M = 2.84) scoring higher than 
participants in the Naïve condition (M = 1.33). The ANOVA analysis was performed for 
Awareness and for Admission with lower than the minimum recommended number of 
participants.  
The main effects of Ethnic prime and Default option swap were not significant; 
all interactions were nonsignificant (see Table 3). The observed power the effect of Norm 
prime was small, .261, and observed power for the remaining effects were smaller, <.18. 
While the effects were nonsignificant, it should be observed that the trend for the 
Norm prime and Ethnic prime conditions matched expectations, with participants in the 
Norm prime condition (M = 2.25) scoring higher than participants in the Control 
condition (M = 1.92). Participants in the Ethnic prime condition scored higher (M = 2.11) 
than those in the Control condition (M = 2.07). For the Default option swap independent 
variable, the Control group actually scored higher (M = 2.22) than the Opt-out group (M 
= 1.96), the opposite trend predicted.   
Admission. A 2 (Informed/Naïve) x 2 (Opt-in/Opt-out) x 2 (Descriptive 
norm/Control) x 2 (Ethnic prime/No prime) ANOVA was also conducted for Admission. 
The main effect of confederate information was significant, F(1, 129) = 19.28 , p < .001, 
η
2
 = .130, with participants in the Informed condition admitting to more information (M 
= 2.36) than participants in the Naïve condition (M = 1.34). No further main effects or 
interactions were significant (see Table 4). The mean values for the Ethnic prime (M = 
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1.83, S.E. = .16) and control condition (M = 1.87, S.E. = .16) were practically identical. 
The trend for the Norm prime condition was in the hypothesized direction, but the 
Default option swap experimental condition appeared to have no effect.  
Nonparametric tests 
The dependent variables Awareness and Admission were measured on an ordinal 
scale and had non-normal distributions. Thus, non-parametric analyses were used to 
examine the hypotheses concerning these variables.  
Nonparametric tests for Awareness. Because the data collected for Awareness 
was non-normal and ordinal, non-parametric testing was appropriate. The a priori 
hypothesis concerning the effect of the Ethnic prime condition on awareness was tested 
using a Mann-Whitney U test. The Mann-Whitney U test was not significant, U = 
2619.00, p = .97; the nonparametric test was also not significant if participants were 
divided by information level (Informed or Naïve). 
Nonparametric tests for Admission. Admission scores were also non-normal 
and ordinal, thus nonparametric tests were performed. Our a priori hypotheses were that 
the Norm prime condition and the Opt-out condition would increase Admission rates over 
control. The Mann-Whitney U test for Admission changes over levels of Norm prime was 
not significant, U = 2356.50, p = .22; the test was also not significant for single levels of 
participant information (Informed or Naïve). The Mann-Whitney U test for changes in 
Admission across levels of Opt-out was also not significant, U = 2277.00, p = .09. When 
the sample was divided by participant information level, Naïve participants were 
significantly different in the Opt-out condition, U = 479.50, p = .047, such that control 
participants (Mean rank = 38.52) had a higher level of Admission than Opt-out  
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Table 3. Two (Informed/Naïve) x 2 (Opt-in/Opt-out) x 2 (Descriptive norm/Control) x 2 
(Ethnic prime/No prime) ANOVA on Awareness. IN = Informed/Naïve. EP = Ethnic 
Prime/Control. NP = Norm prime/Control. OPT = Option swap/Control 
IV Df F Sig η
2
 Power 
IN 1 36.329 .000 .220 1.000 
EP 1 .030 .862 .000 .053 
NP 1 1.765 .186 .013 .261 
OPT 1 1.062 .305 .008 .176 
IN * EP 1 .311 .578 .002 .086 
IN * NP 1 .091 .763 .001 .060 
IN * OPT 1 .040 .841 .000 .055 
EP * NP 1 .025 .874 .000 .053 
EP * OPT 1 .076 .784 .001 .059 
NP * OPT 1 .091 .763 .001 .060 
IN * EP * NP 1 .278 .599 .002 .082 
IN * EP * OPT 1 .243 .623 .002 .078 
IN * NP * OPT 1 1.369 .244 .010 .213 
EP * NP * 
OPT 
1 .408 .524 .003 .097 
IN * EP * NP * 
OPT 
1 .243 .623 .002 .078 
Within 129     
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Table 4. Two (Informed/Naïve) x 2 (Opt-in/Opt-out) x 2 (Descriptive norm/Control) x 2 
(Ethnic prime/No prime) ANOVA on Admission. IN = Informed/Naïve. EP = Ethnic 
Prime/Control. NP = Norm prime/Control. OPT = Option swap/Control 
IV Df F Sig η
2
 Power 
IN 1 19.280 <.001 .130 .992 
EP 1 .028 .868 .000 .053 
NP 1 1.629 .204 .012 .245 
OPT 1 2.482 .118 .019 .346 
IN * EP 1 .250 .618 .002 .079 
IN * NP 1 2.428 .122 .018 .340 
IN * OPT 1 .003 .954 .000 .050 
EP * NP 1 .041 .839 .000 .055 
EP * OPT 1 .551 .459 .004 .114 
NP * OPT 1 1.227 .270 .009 .196 
IN * EP * NP 1 .012 .913 .000 .051 
IN * EP * OPT 1 .167 .683 .001 .069 
IN * NP * OPT 1 1.931 .167 .015 .281 
EP * NP * 
OPT 
1 .765 .383 .006 .140 
IN * EP * NP * 
OPT 
1 1.041 .310 .008 .173 
Within 129     
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participants (Mean rank = 31.96). This was the opposite direction than predicted. 
Informed participants were not significantly different across that condition, U = 659.50, p 
= .48. 
Chi square tests on social influence and ethnic prime. Due to the 
nonparametric nature of the Awareness and Admission variables, an additional set of 
non-parametric χ
2 
tests were performed to assess the deviation of the experimental 
condition results from control conditions. The χ
2 
tests were perhaps more appropriate for 
this dataset; the Awareness and Admission scores fell primarily into either category 1 or 
category 5, fitting a binary pattern better than a distribution. For both Awareness and 
Admission, data from control conditions were used as the expected frequencies; data 
from participants receiving the experimental manipulation served as the observed 
frequencies. Again, data from Awareness and Admission were entered on the binary scale 
of Minimal information or Substantial information. These analyses showed only one 
statistically significant difference (see Table 5): participants that did not receive the 
Ethnic prime and did receive the Norm prime reported greater levels of Admission, χ
2
 = 






 For an experimental procedure specifically aimed at eliciting accurate feedback, 
the Awareness and Admission scores of participants was distressingly low. Almost all of 
the participants in the study with compromising information about the study design did 
not hint at this information. Across experimental conditions, Informed participants did 
report more Awareness and Admission. The Informed participants were explicitly told 
information just before the experiment started that, on the PEI, should elicit scores of 5 
for Awareness and Admission; thus, this result is unsurprising. While the increase was 
statistically significant, the difference would have been much higher had participants 
reported accurately on the PEI. Contrary to expectations, neither the norm prime nor the 
opt-out condition improved Awareness or Admission. 
Replicating the impression formation results 
To the benefit of the impression formation procedure, perhaps, was our finding 
that negative rating of a hypothetical individual was not related to information level; this 
was contrary to our hypothesis that informed participants would show decreased negative 
rating. Participants’ negative ratings were also unrelated to social monitoring or social 
desirability. Lepore and Brown (1996) was not replicated-- participants in the ethnic 
prime category did not expressed more negative attitude toward the individual. This 
could be due to issues of power, or to the difference between the current sample 
(University students in the U.S. Midwest) and the original study’s sample (U.K. 
students). It is assumed that the attribution of negative traits to the hypothetical individual 
(Lepore & Brown, 1996) represents implicit prejudices when the negative rating  
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Table 5. Chi-squared comparisons of Informed participants receiving no experimental 
manipulations to participants receiving listed experimental conditions. IN = 










EP NP 10 8 10, 11 .536 .464 
EP OPT 10 11 10, 8 .455 .500 
EP Combined 5 5 20, 19 .026 .873 
Ct NP 11 6 10, 10 1.894 .169 
Ct OPT 10 9 11, 7 .519 .471 
Ct Combined 5 4 5, 5 .125 .724 
Combined NP 21 14 20, 21 2.150 .143 
Combined OPT 20 20 21, 15 1.000 .317 









EP NP 13 5 14, 7 .323 .570 
EP OPT 15 6 12, 6 .200 .655 
EP Combined 7 3 27, 12 .011 .917 
Ct NP 13 43 11, 9 5.124 .024* 
Ct OPT 11 8 13, 5 1.516 .218 
Ct Combined 5 4 5, 5 .125 .724 
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Combined NP 26 9 25, 16 3.802 .051 
Combined OPT 26 14 25, 11 .313 .576 
Combined Combined 12 7 11, 9 .572 .449 
*Significant, p < .05 
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increases as a result of an ethnic prime. That these results were not replicated may 
indicate that participants in our sample did not associate the ethnic prime with the 
hypothetical individual, or may indicate that the participants in this sample do not have 
elevated implicit biases against an individual they implicitly assume is Black. Some 
participants did correctly report on the PEI that the study was attempting to manipulate 
them into believing the individual was Black, however, only two Naïve participants were 
classified as providing Substantial information about the true study hypothesis, however. 
While the frequency of participant reporting is assuredly lower than actual participant 
knowledge, this does suggest that fewer participants in the Naïve category than Informed 
did believe the study was about race, bolstering the second interpretation. 
The effect of social influence 
 The norm prime condition did increase PEI accuracy, but due to the lack of power 
and small sample size for the ANOVA, this result was not statistically significant or 
practically useful; the χ
2
 test on participants receiving a Norm prime prompt with neutral 
words indicated a difference for Admission. The observed power for the each null 
hypothesis in this experiment was far below the benchmark of .80. Previous research 
shows that reported Admission and Awareness of the study hypothesis by participants is 
rare (Blackhart, et al, 2012; Edlund, et al, 2009; Golding & Lichtenstein, 1970; Levy, 
1967; and Lichtenstein, 1973). The level of participant Awareness and Admission was 
low, even in the Informed condition, which was significantly greater than the Naïve 
condition. This extreme positive skew hampers ANOVA analysis. The small cell sizes in 
this experiment also cast doubt on the χ
2
 analyses. While issues of statistical power may 
have prevented this effect from being statistically significant, the norm prime prompt 
 
32 
used in this study did not elicit enough accurate feedback to be confidently recommended 
for inclusion in PEI procedures. The norm prime used in this study could be changed to 
increase the salience of both descriptive and injunctive norms, perhaps. In the current 
study (see Appendix B), participants in the norm prime condition were told that previous 
participants freely admitted problems or weaknesses in the study design. Participants 
were told by the norm prime prompt that classmates and friends may share critical study 
information and that this is a flaw in the study design, but were not explicitly told to 
report this information on the PEI. The PEI questions prompted the reporting of this 
information, however. While the logical steps between each piece of feedback are 
apparent from a researcher’s-eye view of the study, perhaps participants in the moment 
do not all connect these pieces. The caution against stronger, more specific questions is 
that leading questions may arouse suspicion in participants where none existed before. If 
more direct, suspicious questions were found to increase Admission or Awareness rates, 
this would create a trade-off for researchers between obtaining accurate feedback and 
reducing suspicion in the participant pool.   
For the opt-out condition, no evidence was found that groups differed based on 
receiving this condition. The default option swap has been shown to be effective for 
important outcomes such as organ donation (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003) but has not 
been less explored for small effects such as the subtle implicit influences in the current 
study. The default option swap was utilized in this study because it is a social influence 
technique that is extremely easy to implement in PEIs while having empirically supported 
efficacy. Its lack of effect in the current experiment indicates it is not appropriate for the 
subtle social situation introduced in the lab. Participants may have been unconvinced to 
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follow the implied truth-telling norm or the introduction of this norm, via the check box, 
was not salient. 
Can recommendations for PEI accuracy be made? 
 The primary purpose of this study was to attempt to increase Admission and 
Awareness rates on a standard PEI. If the trends in the data are extrapolated and it is 
assumed that the effects of Norm prime will be significantly positive (a very optimistic 
interpretation of the data), the effect size of the likeliest candidate to increase PEI 
accuracy, Norm prime, will most likely be small. While inclusion of a Norm prime aspect 
to any PEI is not likely to be harmful, it is also not likely to solve the dilemma of PEI 
accuracy. If the level of participant awareness in an experiment cannot be accurately 
measured, this calls into question any conclusions drawn from that experiment that rely 
on participant naiveté to the hypotheses.  
 Further explorations of social influence techniques may yield better results. Social 
influence research encompasses many topics that might be applicable to a PEI. 
Participants could be primed for the motives of reciprocity or liking, for example, by 
encountering information about the benefits of participation or friendly experimenters, 
for example (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). As mentioned previously, a trade-off between 
eliciting suspiciousness and increasing accuracy might be achievable by giving 
participants specific, guided questions about previous research knowledge.  
 Other factors, not addressed in this research, may be contributing to PEI accuracy. 
The participants recruited for this study were from introductory psychology classes such 
as Introduction to Psychology and Introduction to Statistics. This step was taken to 
minimize the amount of experience students had with research methods and experimental 
 
34 
designs. Perhaps students with more knowledge of research methods would be more 
likely to report accurately no PEIs. While this would not solve the problem of recruiting 
suspicious freshmen for psychology studies, it might lead to a practical way to improve 
PEI accuracy such as focusing on research methods during entry-level psychology 
classes. The minority of students that were not freshman or sophomores were, 
presumably, new to the major of psychology. 
 In conversations about PEI accuracy with colleagues, the discussion is usually 
framed in terms of participant honesty. While participant dishonesty may be the primary 
source of PEI inaccuracy, it may also be unawareness by participants about what 
constitutes questionable information they receive about a study. In some of our PEI free 
response answers, participants are clearly aware that a stray remark “about racism” is 
potentially damaging to the data they have provided. In the majority of answers, however, 
participants express nothing of the sort. The deception element in the study protocol is, 
hypothetically, so convincing that Informed participants are in some sense still deceived. 
Implicit tendencies, such as different response behavior on IATs, may apply to this subset 
of participants without their awareness. 
Conclusion 
 In a study specifically designed to assess truthful participant suspiciousness and 
study information, the truthful reporting of study information was abysmally low. While 
it is unfortunate that the results of this experiment were inconclusive, these null results 
ironically highlight the need for greater care in PEI construction and greater caution in 

















Scoring rubric for Awareness and Admission scores 
Awareness 
1 – No awareness or suspicion of the experimental deception or purpose of the study 
indicated. 
2 – General suspiciousness about the purpose of the study or how the parts of the study 
relate, but participant is completely unaware of the deception or true purpose of the study. 
This includes general suspicion of psychology studies. 
3 – Targeted incorrect suspicion. Suspicion about a particular part of the study (e.g., the 
experimental confederate, the feedback given, specific tasks that were completed). 
4 – Partial or inaccurate awareness of the experimental deception or true purpose of the 
study. Mention of ethnicity or stereotypes without directly stating the study is assessing 
racial stereotypes. 
5 – Complete awareness. Any mention of racism or assessing racial stereotypes. 
Admission 
1 – No admission of prior information (i.e., denial of previous conversation). 
2 – Admission of receiving public  or ordinary info (i.e., SONA, info from the 
experimenter or prompts). 
3 – Admit to discussing the study with someone else, but no information shared; mention 
of elements in the Naïve prompt. 
4 – Admit to discussing the study and being told certain details; the details are vague or 
inaccurate (but different than the Naïve prompt). 






Post-experimental inquiry questions including experimental manipulations (marked in 
italics). 
PEI1 ("Instructions") 
"We would like your feedback about the design of the study. We want to make sure that 
our experimental design is sound, and we need your feedback to help us improve this 
study. In addition, we want to know whether anything odd or irregular happened as you 
participated in the study today. These things sometimes happen, and as long as we know 
about them, we can correct for them, and make sure that our findings are valid and 
reliable. It is therefore extremely important for the scientific validity of the study that you 
tell us if anything like this happened today.  
Please be as honest as possible in your answers; no feedback we receive, including 
negative feedback, will result in a loss of research credit, nor will it affect how we use 
your data. In fact, negative feedback is an important way for us to improve upon our 
design for future studies. Be as detailed as you feel is necessary to fully answer each 
question.  
You may spend as much time on these questions as you want, but we ask that you spend 
a minimum of 5 min answering these questions. 
PEI2 
Many things can go wrong in an experiment's design. Survey items can be confusing or 
difficult. Technical difficulties often come up without the experimenter finding out. Before 
an experiment, participants sometimes hear critical details of the study from classmates 
or friends. Experimenters sometimes, accidentally, give out confusing or extra 
information about a study. Participants sometimes, on their own, 'figure out' the study 
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design. Research in this lab shows that, overwhelmingly, participants who identify 
weaknesses in our studies reveal this." 
PEI13 (appeared after “Instructions” or PEI2) 
"Either on my own or by receiving it from classmates, friends, or acquaintances, I know 
important details of the study that the experimenter is not aware of." 
Checkbox option: "No, I am not withholding my knowledge of study information.") 
PEI2 
"In your own words, what was the present study about?" 
PEI3 
"Did you believe, at any time, that the experiment dealt with anything other than what the 
experimenter had described to you?" 
PEI4 
"Did this affect your behavior in any way?" 
PEI5 
"Did you feel that certain reactions were expected from you at any time?" 
PEI6 
"Sometimes people may hear something about a study before they participate in that 
study. Did you have any information about this study before participating, from any 
source (e.g., from other students, your psychology instructor, psychology textbooks, 
previous research you have participated in)? If yes, please tell us what information you 
had before participating in the study (we are not interested in finding out how or from 





"Did you believe the experiment attempted to manipulate your attitude or behavior at any 
point?" 
PEI8 
"Did you have any doubts or suspicions about any information given to you prior to your 
participation or during the study?" 
PEI9 
"Did your experimenter do anything to cause you to be suspicious?" 
PEI10 
"Sometimes psychology studies include elements of deception. Did you expect to be 
deceived in this study?" 
PEI11 
"Where there any questions or procedures in this study that were unclear, or any parts of 
the study that were poorly designed (i.e., confusing, or with technical problems)?" 
PEI12 
"At any time, did the experimenter (accidentally or intentionally) act unprofessionally? 
At any time, were you provided with additional, extra instructions (i.e., help you did not 









Impression formation task sentences. 
He plays football regularly. 
He sometimes forgets plans and dates that were made in advance. 
He goes to parties most weekends. 
He can easily get angry at people who disagree with him. 
He cannot be bothered to be on time for meetings and appointments. 
He goes jogging a few times a week.  
He is fun to be around. 
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